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The genetic evolution of altruism (i.e., a behavior resulting in a
net reduction of the survival and/or reproduction of an actor to
benefit a recipient) once perplexed biologists because it seemed
paradoxical in a Darwinian world. More than half a century ago,
W. D. Hamilton explained that when interacting individuals are
genetically related, alleles for altruism can be favored by selec-
tion because they are carried by individuals more likely to interact
with other individuals carrying the alleles for altruism than ran-
dom individuals in the population (“kin selection”). In recent
decades, a substantial number of supposedly alternative path-
ways to altruism have been published, leading to controversies
surrounding explanations for the evolution of altruism. Here, we
systematically review the 200 most impactful papers published
on the evolution of altruism and identify 43 evolutionary mod-
els in which altruism evolves and where the authors attribute
the evolution of altruism to a pathway other than kin selection
and/or deny the role of relatedness. An analysis of these models
reveals that in every case the life cycle assumptions entail local
reproduction and local interactions, thereby leading to interact-
ing individuals being genetically related. Thus, contrary to the
authors’ claims, Hamilton’s relatedness drives the evolution to
altruism in their models. The fact that several decades of inves-
tigating the evolution to altruism have resulted in the systematic
and unwitting rediscovery of the same mechanism is testament
to the fundamental importance of positive relatedness between
actor and recipient for explaining the evolution of altruism.
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Academic discoveries are often made simultaneously andindependently by multiple scientists (1–3). In the 17th cen-
tury, Newton and Leibniz independently developed calculus. The
theory of evolution by natural selection was discovered inde-
pendently by Charles Darwin (1858) and Alfred Wallace (1858).
There are also instances of the same discovery being made many
years apart. The heliocentric solar system was first discovered by
the Ancient Greek astronomer Aristarchos of Samos (∼310 to
230 BC), but received little attention until it was independently
rediscovered 18 centuries later by the Renaissance mathemati-
cian Nicolaus Copernicus. Such asynchronous rediscoveries have
become rare in a globalized world of communication between
distant regions and accessible online information. However, over
the past few decades a striking exception has unfolded in the
evolutionary sciences, where many researchers have repeatedly
rediscovered that interactions between relatives favor the evo-
lution of altruistic traits, despite this mechanism having been
uncovered and mathematically described more than half a cen-
tury ago by W. D. Hamilton (4–6). What is more, unlike previous
cases, this rediscovery does not seem to have resulted from igno-
rance of the existence of previous work, but from a failure to
recognize the equivalence between the processes underlying the
models.
The question of the genetic evolution of altruism—defined
here as a behavior decreasing the expected survival and/or repro-
duction (fitness) of the actor while increasing the fitness of the
recipient—rose to prominence because altruism seemed para-
doxical in a Darwinian world. In 1963, Hamilton showed that to
understand the genetic evolution of altruism, and more gener-
ally of any trait, it is crucial to consider the average fitness of
all individuals bearing a given allele responsible for producing
a change in that trait. In particular, in a population of homo-
geneous individuals, an altruism-inducing allele will increase in
frequency when rb− c> 0, where −c is the average effect of
the altruism-inducing allele on the fitness of its bearer, b is the
average effect on the fitness of recipients, and r is the genetic
relatedness between the actor and the recipients (7).
Relatedness r is a regression coefficient measuring how the
alleles in a particular individual covary in frequency with those
of individuals with whom the individual interacts (8, 9). Relat-
edness is thus a measure of the extent to which the recipient of
altruism is more likely than a random individual in the popu-
lation to carry the altruism-inducing allele present in the actor.
Usually, such assortment results from actor and recipient hav-
ing inherited identical alleles from a recent common ancestor
(i.e., alleles in actor and recipient are identical by descent; see
Box 1 for more complex situations). For example, family struc-
ture results in particular relatedness patterns: In diploid species
where mating occurs randomly in the population, siblings have a
relatedness of 1/2 (i.e., they have a 50% chance of having inher-
ited the same allele from their parents at any given locus) and
the relatedness between aunt and nephew is 1/4. Because the
best-known cases of altruism occur between highly related indi-
viduals, John Maynard Smith coined the term kin selection to
describe the operation of natural selection in a context where
interactions occur among genetically related individuals (10, 11).
Unfortunately, this has sometimes given the incorrect impres-
sion that kin selection operates only within structured families.
In reality, kin selection operates as soon as there is limited
genetic mixing and interacting group size is not infinite, as in the
“viscous,” “island,” and “stepping-stone” models of spatial pop-
ulation structure described in Fig. 1. In these models, dispersal
is limited and locally interacting individuals are likely to share
Significance
The canonical explanation for the evolution of altruism (“kin
selection”)—which was mathematically derived in the 1960s
by W. D. Hamilton—emphasizes the importance of genetic
relatedness. Over the past three decades, numerous authors
claim to have discovered alternative explanations. We sys-
tematically analyze the models substantiating these claims
and reveal that in every model the interacting individuals
are genetically related and that the authors have therefore
unwittingly rediscovered Hamilton’s insight.
Author contributions: T.K., L.K., and L.L. designed research; T.K. and L.L. analyzed data;
and T.K., L.K., and L.L. wrote the paper.y
The authors declare no competing interest.y
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.y
Published under the PNAS license.y
1 To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: Laurent.Keller@unil.ch.y
This article contains supporting information online at https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/
doi:10.1073/pnas.2013596117/-/DCSupplemental.y


































Box 1: Relatedness and Green Beard Models.
Relatedness is a measure of assortment of alleles between
actor and recipient, where assortment means that actor and
recipient share more alleles that are identical by state than
the population average. And assortment, whereby individu-
als bearing altruistic alleles preferentially benefit from the
altruism of other individuals bearing altruistic alleles, is a
necessary condition for genetic altruism to be favored by
kin selection (4, 12, 17). As explained in the main text,
in family-structured populations and under limited disper-
sal, assortment results from actor and recipient sharing
identical-by-state alleles that are identical by descent, so that
interacting individuals are positively related. While identity
by descent is the main mechanism generating assortment,
identical-by-state assortment can also occur without identity
by descent. One such scenario is where the same altruis-
tic allele arises frequently through mutation and recognizes
replicate copies in other individuals. This is the “green beard
effect” (42, 43), a mechanism for the evolution of altruism
discussed (but not investigated formally) by Hamilton (6)
and Dawkins (42). While the green beard mechanism it is
an intriguing thought experiment, it is unlikely that it could
drive the genetic evolution of altruism independent of kin
selection. First, its requirements are very stringent: A sin-
gle Mendelian element must encode a signal, the ability to
discriminate among others on the basis of that signal, and
an altruistic phenotype. Second, if these requirements are
met, modeling shows that the process is generally unstable
(44). Finally, even when green beard models entail interac-
tions among relatives, where one would expect them to be
more stable, without a near perfect association between sig-
nal and altruistic phenotype, the evolutionary dynamics tend
to remain unstable (45).
alleles from a common ancestor who lived in the same spatial
neighborhood in previous generations. Under limited dispersal,
the genetic components of evolving traits expressed by an actor
therefore affect the reproduction and survival of others who
share alleles identical by descent with the actor at the loci deter-
mining the trait. This is the defining condition for kin selection
to operate (12, 13). Since most if not all populations are likely
to exhibit some form of limited genetic mixing (14), hence most
if not all social traits are likely to be shaped by kin selection
to at least some extent (15). Importantly, limited genetic mixing
also implies that interactions occur locally and hence that related
individuals are more likely to compete against each other than
are individuals sampled at random from the population. This
leads to the occurrence of “kin competition.” Under certain sit-
uations, kin competition can cancel out the indirect benefits of
altruism and prevent the evolution of phenotypes increasing the
survival and reproduction of neighbors (13, 16). Yet, even in this
context, phenotypic evolution is shaped by kin selection.
Despite the fact that kin selection is known to operate under
limited dispersal, mathematical and simulation models employ-
ing the population structures described in Fig. 1 often claim to
have found new mechanisms to account for the evolution of
altruism. A number of previous studies have taken particular
such models and mathematically proved that relatedness is pos-
itive among interacting individuals and that altruism would not
evolve without it (22–27). However, these efforts have enjoyed
little success in curbing false claims about the novelty of the
mechanism driving the evolution of altruism. And, while a core
of evolutionary biologists working on altruism remain confident
about the central role of relatedness, the larger circle of evo-
lutionists and laypeople who follow this literature now believe
that the issue remains unsolved. Here we therefore take a differ-
ent approach. We broadly survey the literature to identify papers
claiming alternative mechanisms and then analyze the life cycle
assumptions of these models (i.e., the demographic, behavioral,
and genetic assumptions underlying all events faced by organisms
in an evolving population) to investigate whether they allow the
evolution of altruism without positive relatedness between inter-
acting individuals (i.e., whether altruism can evolve without kin
selection).
Results and Discussion
The claims of novel mechanisms to account for the evolution of
altruism are too numerous to review comprehensively. There-
fore, we identified the most prominent examples by selecting
the top 100 Google Scholar search results for each of “evolu-
tion of cooperation” and “evolution of altruism” (SI Appendix,
Tables S1 and S2; total = 195 papers; 5 appeared under both).
Seventy-six of these papers do not present formal evolution-
ary models. We scrutinized the life cycles of the remaining 119
papers, which do present formal evolutionary models. These
models investigate the dynamics of either genetic variants (alle-
les) or cultural variants (memes) with most considering only
two competing variants (one “altruistic” and one “selfish”).
In many of the models, whether the expression of a particu-
lar allele (or meme) results in altruism (i.e., c> 0 and b> 0)
or merely cooperation—defined as a behavior increasing the
fitness of both actor and recipient (i.e., c< 0 and b> 0)—
depends on the parameter values determining the life cycle. This
parameter dependence arises because the costs and benefits are
defined operationally as the lifetime fitness effects of an actor on
Fig. 1. Population structure and relatedness, reproduced from Hamilton
(17), who discussed how limited dispersal induced by various population
structures influences patterns of relatedness and thereby affects the evo-
lution of social behavior. In the panmictic and viscous models, smaller dots
indicate younger individuals, and arrows indicate parenthood. In the island
and stepping-stone models, younger individuals are not shown because
reproduction occurs within groups. Arrows indicate dispersal between
groups. For the viscous, island, and stepping-stone models, locally interact-
ing individuals are positively related under limited dispersal, and the local
relatedness structure has been explored in the field of population genetics
(13, 18–21). The viscous model with continuous space is the most challeng-
ing to analyze and remains the least explored, yet it is probably the most
realistic model for plant populations. Most of the papers rediscovering kin
selection use either the island model (using groups of size >1 and with
interactions occurring within groups) or the stepping-stone model (using
“groups” composed of a single individual, represented as the node of a
lattice structure; since migration links nodes, the population becomes a net-
work with interactions occurring between neighboring nodes). Reprinted
with permission from ref. 17.








































recipients and are therefore complex functions of all life cycle
features. In particular, since costs and benefits are affected by
kin competition, they depend on parameters defining the spa-
tial structure of the evolving population (equation 7.13 in ref. 13,
equations 5–7 in ref. 24, and figures 1 and 2 in ref. 28), and since
they are affected by the type of interaction and the likelihood
of repeated interaction, they depend on parameters defining the
behavioral interactions between individuals (equation 5 in ref.
29 and equations 8 and 9 in ref. 26). These (lifetime) fitness
costs c and benefits b are therefore nontrivial to calculate and
essentially never correspond directly to the proximate costs and
benefits of the prisoner’s dilemma stage game matrix to which
they may be naively equated (the exception being a panmictic
population with one-shot interactions). Further, for a given sit-
uation, the cost c may change sign, from altruism (positive) to
cooperation (negative), as a function of the model’s parameter
values, such as dispersal rate and group size (see figures 1 and
2 in ref. 28 for illustrative examples). Since quantitatively calcu-
lating c and b can be very demanding for a given model, we here
qualitatively infer whether c is expected to be positive or negative
as this can often be done on examination of the life cycle assump-
tions. Overall, altruism evolved under some parameter values in
models presented in 89 of these papers. Among the remaining
30 papers, cooperation evolved in 28 cases, and we were unable
to assess whether altruism or cooperation evolved in the remain-
ing 2 cases (marked as “insufficient information” in SI Appendix,
Tables S1 and S2).
Among the 89 altruism models, 46 adopted Hamilton’s con-
ceptual framework, attributing the evolution of altruism to
positive relatedness. The remaining 43 all claimed alternative
mechanisms. To evaluate the veracity of their claims, we first sub-
divided these 43 papers into those where the role of relatedness
was denied (17 cases; SI Appendix, Table S3), and those which
made little or no mention of relatedness (26 cases; SI Appendix,
Table S4).
Among the 17 papers where the presence/role of relatedness
was denied (SI Appendix, Table S3), our analysis of the life
cycles of the models showed that the proposed scenario led to
positive relatedness between interacting agents in every case.
Moreover, in most of these models, agents reproduced clonally
(e.g., “parents pass on their type to their offspring”) with inter-
actions occurring among nearest neighbors, as in the stepping-
stone model of Fig. 1, with only one individual per node/group.
This represents the tritest instance of kin selection. Relatedness
coefficients equal 1 between parent and offspring and between
siblings, and dispersal is limited to neighboring nodes so par-
ents place offspring therein and subsequently interact with them.
While many of these models are framed in terms of the trans-
mission of cultural variants (or memes) and are often called
“strategies” (with strategies with higher payoffs being more
frequently “imitated”), from a conceptual evolutionary dynam-
ics perspective these models are indistinguishable from genetic
models, since they both investigate the differential proliferation
of different variants in a population. Different modes of cultural
transmission (e.g., payoff-biased learning, vertical transmission,
one to many transmission such as following a leader) (30) will
affect the level of relatedness between interacting individuals
as well as the amount of (cultural) kin competition between
them, and this can result in higher or lower selection pressure
on altruism than under genetic transmission (31). However, no
other mechanism has been discovered, since selection still acts
on the social trait according to relatedness (and competition)
because traits are inherited and subject to differential prolif-
eration. Thus, altruism spreads via cultural transmission when
altruistic actors preferentially help individuals to whom they
are positively culturally related. Hence, these models represent
an advance only insofar as Hamilton never applied his frame-
work to cultural evolution [this was pioneered in the 1990s (32)
and has been applied concretely to the calculation of cultural
relatedness in the “island model” of Fig. 1 (31) and reviewed
(33)]. The inconsistency between the novelty claims of these
publications and their content is difficult to explain. One likely
contributing factor is the nonbiological framing of the mod-
els; terms such as “site update” and “strategy invasion” replace
birth and death, and “players” and “neighbors” replace organ-
isms, siblings, and offspring. This semantic divergence obfus-
cates the relation between these models and the established
theory.
The 26 papers which make little or no mention of related-
ness attribute the evolution of altruism to diverse alternative
mechanisms including “social diversity,” “social viscosity,” “topo-
logical heterogeneity,” “network heterogeneity,” “network reci-
procity,” “spatial reciprocity,” “spatial structure,” and “multiplex
structure” (SI Appendix, Table S4). Analysis of these models
revealed that in every case interacting individuals are related,
relatives benefit from each other’s altruism, and kin selection
therefore operates. This occurs through limited dispersal (or lim-
ited cultural mixing) and local interaction as in the island and
stepping-stone models of Fig. 1. Again, the framing of these mod-
els obscures the underlying role of relatedness. For example,
Szolnoki et al. (ref. 34, p. 2) write, “First, a randomly selected
player x acquires its payoff px by playing the game with its
nearest neighbors. Next, one randomly chosen neighbor denoted
by y also acquires its payoff py by playing the game with its
four neighbors. Lastly, player x tries to enforce its strategy sx
on player y in accordance with the probability, W (sx → sy)=
wx/ (1+ exp[(py − px )/K ]), where K denotes the amplitude of
noise.” For a biologist, this translates as follows: Individuals are
randomly killed and tend to be replaced by the clonal offspring
of their most fecund neighbors. In this situation, individuals will
interact preferentially with clonal relatives, and interactions are
likely to occur between parents and offspring and siblings owing
to the stepping-stone structure (Fig. 1) of the model. Altruistic
alleles (or memes) therefore spread through genetic (or cultural)
kin selection.
The most commonly cited alternative mechanism to kin selec-
tion is “spatial selection.” This mechanism was pioneered by
Martin Nowak, who has been uniquely vocal in attempting to
differentiate it from kin selection [e.g., “it is clear that kin selec-
tion is different from group selection and different from spatial
selection” (ref. 35, p. 26)] despite his claims being repeatedly
and formally dismissed (22–27). Using Google Scholar we there-
fore identified his 10 most impactful spatial selection papers (SI
Appendix, Table S5). All of these papers use models where indi-
viduals interact with relatives and where kin selection affects the
evolution of altruism. Three of these Nowak papers already fea-
ture in SI Appendix, Table S3 [Traulsen and Nowak (36) and
Nowak et al. (37)] and SI Appendix, Table S4 [Ohtsuki et al.
(38)]. The remaining seven constitute SI Appendix, Table S6. The
models are of various types but all use lattice or graph popula-
tion structures, which are akin to the stepping-stone model of
Fig. 1. The occurrence of such clear-cut rediscovery is easier to
understand when considering the chronological development of
the separate literatures. While Nowak’s earlier models adopted
rather different assumptions from those of the more biolog-
ically oriented concurrent/earlier kin selection literature, they
converged to them over time (Box 2).
The claims that spatial structure affects the evolution of altru-
ism are not incorrect per se. As Hamilton himself emphasized
(17), limited dispersal and local interaction lead to positive
relatedness among interacting individuals, which may promote
altruism under certain biological scenarios, as long as kin compe-
tition is not too strong. Hence, the finding that spatial selection
favors altruism is not novel, and the emphasis on space can
be misleading; space is merely a proxy for relatedness patterns
and in itself not sufficient to explain altruism. Space provides


































Box 2: Evolution of Theoretical Evolution Models.
We here briefly explore the “rediscovery” history of the
spatial selection literature. This is useful as through under-
standing this history, one can better understand how such
large-scale rediscovery could have occurred. The broad
assumptions of Martin Nowak and colleagues’ models dif-
fered from those of “typical” kin selection models initially
[in the 1990s; reviewed in 2004 (13)] and converged to them
only over time. Unlike typical kin selection models, the sim-
ulations of Nowak and May (46, 47) do not allow for any
chance effects in reproduction (i.e., genetic drift). The mod-
els are therefore fully deterministic, meaning that altruism
can never spread when rare, since a single altruistic mutant
will be immediately eliminated as it would be surrounded on
all sides by nonaltruists receiving higher payoffs. This means
that relatedness can never build up. But, when the simula-
tions are initiated with multiple altruists so that interacting
individuals experience identical-by-state assortment, then
altruism can be maintained but undergoes chaotic temporal
dynamics [e.g., Nowak and May (47)]. While the initial altru-
ists are identical by state, and not related, their offspring
are identical by descent (related) and likely to interact,
since there is limited genetic mixing. Kin selection there-
fore plays a role in the evolutionary dynamics of altruism
[as acknowledged by Nowak and May (ref. 47, p. 76)]. In
the simulations of Nowak et al. (48, 49) chance effects in
reproduction are allowed, meaning that local genetic drift
allows relatedness to build up and altruistic alleles increase
in frequency when rare, so that kin selection can operate
at all allele frequencies. Finally, Ohtsuki et al. (38) provide
mathematical solutions to the spread of altruism in stepping-
stone–like models under weak selection. This paper makes
the same assumptions as previous kin selection models and
analyzing the model with Hamilton’s rule yields identical
results (22, 24). Over time, the spatial selection models
thus became more biologically realistic as they converged to
typical previous kin selection models.
no detailed information about the fitness cost c and benefit b,
depending on which the same spatial arrangement may favor
altruism and/or intensify kin competition. Moreover, to focus
on such a proxy is unhelpful as it is difficult to intuit how
the evolution of altruism will respond to different biological
assumptions. Consider mating systems. It is clear that polyandry
(where females mate with multiple males) will result in decreased
relatedness among interacting individuals relative to monoandry
(where females mate with only one male) (39); relatedness also
decreases with migration, group size, and environmental distur-
bance, while it tends to increase with survival and variance in
reproductive success (13). In other words, how life cycle factors
affect relatedness has been extensively worked out and is often
intuitively clear, allowing empiricists to make and test predictions
across diverse biological systems (40). It is unclear, however, how
different biological assumptions (e.g., a change in the mating sys-
tem or group composition) would interact with spatial selection.
Consequently, these models do not provide testable predictions
for biological scenarios beyond their authors’ many and highly
specific assumptions.
While it remains surprising that so many specific models not
tightly connected to the preceding literature are published, we
envisage at least three reasons for the serial rediscovery of the
role of relatedness. First, these models are often presented by
people with strong formal training, but who are not evolution-
ary biologists (e.g., physicists, economists, mathematicians), and
who have a limited understanding of genetics. Hamilton’s rule
is a population genetics theory result, and population genetics
itself is an application of dynamical system and stochastic pro-
cess theories. Yet, while these latter theories are well known to
formally trained scientists, nonbiologists tend to approach the
problem of the evolution of altruism from a textbook dynami-
cal systems perspective, thereby narrowly focusing on the iconic
replicator equation while eschewing well-established and impor-
tant population genetic results. Second, Hamilton’s rule seems
so intuitively clear to evolutionary biologists that they often do
not engage with it as a formal population genetic theory and
are not always rigorous in providing hard proofs to substantiate
models of the evolution of social traits. This is exemplified by
the fact that it took four decades to formally integrate Hamil-
ton’s rule into the wider context of evolutionary game theory
and adaptive dynamics. The basis of a conceptually transparent
and wide-ranging kin selection theory was obtained only at the
turn of the 20th century (41), while it was treated as such long
before. Finally, some authors simply do not engage at all with
the extensive kin selection theory literature, aware that doing so
would cost considerable time and effort and could limit the bold-
ness of the originality claims that they felt able to make “in good
faith.” This has proved particularly true for some evolutionists
from nonbiological backgrounds who have been highly success-
ful in publishing studies dramatically overselling the novelty of
their findings.
Conclusion
The field of evolutionary science has become replete with claims
of novel mechanisms for the evolution of altruism. Previous
papers have reanalyzed specific “novel” models to show their
exact equivalence to results from preceding kin selection models
(22–27) and thus their redundancy with established knowledge.
Here, we have conducted a broader-scale analysis of these claims
to reveal how and why these authors have unconsciously con-
structed situations in which kin selection operates. While we
examined only the most prominent papers, we are not aware of
any other paper that provides a biologically relevant explanation
for the evolution of altruism by a mechanism other than positive
relatedness between actor and recipient, as originally outlined by
Hamilton (4–6, 17). The fact that researchers from diverse fields
across the social and natural sciences have systematically reached
similar conclusions is testament to the stricture of Hamilton’s
ideas.
Materials and Methods
To systematically evaluate the claims that altruism could evolve by mech-
anisms other than kin selection, we selected the first 100 Google Scholar
search results for each of evolution of altruism (SI Appendix, Table S1) and
evolution of cooperation (SI Appendix, Table S2). In Google Scholar, papers
are ranked according to their relevance to the search terms as well as the
number of citations, meaning that our results will feature the most rele-
vant and impactful papers, with a bias toward older papers. For each search
result, we proceeded as follows:
1) We assessed whether a formal evolutionary model was presented. The
search results come from fields as diverse as law, economics, physics, and
biology and range in substance from theoretical research to empirical
research, to reviews, books, and philosophical treatises.
2) For papers which presented a formal evolutionary model, we qualita-
tively evaluated whether altruism or cooperation increases in frequency
under selection in the models presented in the paper; that is, whether
b > 0 and c > 0. All models have b > 0 because all consider a situation
where individuals increase the survival or reproduction of others (i.e.,
helping behavior). Whether c > 0 depends on the models’ assumptions
and population state. For instance, when interactions are modeled as a
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game under panmixia, the action “defect”
always results in a higher payoff than the action “cooperate,” and c > 0.
But, for various more complicated scenarios (e.g., other types of game,
repeated interaction, small interactive group sizes), actors may derive
direct benefits from their action, in which case the sign of c depends
on specific parameter settings (13, 24, 26, 28, 29), as well as on the








































frequency of traits, alleles, or memes in the population. We therefore
classified these papers according to whether the evolved trait is “altru-
ism,” “cooperation,” or “parameter dependent” (SI Appendix, Tables S1,
S2, and S5).
3) If altruism could evolve in at least one model presented in a given paper,
we next identified the mechanism to which the authors attributed the
evolution of altruism and subdivided the papers which attribute the evo-
lution of altruism to an evolutionary process other than kin selection
into two categories: those which deny the role of relatedness in their
models (SI Appendix, Table S3, where quotes denying relatedness are
provided) and those which make no mention of relatedness (SI Appendix,
Table S4, where the proposed alternative mechanism is identified). For
both of these categories we examined the life cycle assumptions model,
in particular the modes of reproduction (e.g., the dispersal kernel) and
interactions (e.g., the group size within which individuals interact), to
evaluate whether the model is expected to lead to positive relatedness
between interacting individuals. If relatedness is expected to be nonzero
on the basis of this qualitative analysis, we then stated that kin selection
operates.
In addition to these analyses, we focused on the most frequently cited
alternative mechanism to kin selection: spatial selection, pioneered by
Martin Nowak. We used the search term “Nowak cooperation” to identify
his 10 most impactful spatial selection papers (SI Appendix, Table S5). We
categorized all search results according to the scheme described above and
then, again, analyzed the life cycle assumptions of these models to identify
the modes of interaction and reproduction. Based on these, we indicated
whether or not kin selection will operate (SI Appendix, Table S6).
Data Availability. All study data are included in this article and SI Appendix.
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The evolution of altruism and the serial rediscovery of the role of
relatedness - supplementary information
Tomas Kay1, Laurent Keller1*, and Laurent Lehmann1
1Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Literature search results
This supplement comprises six tables. Tables S1 and S2 contain the first hundred results obtained using the Google
Scholar search terms “Evolution of altruism” and “Evolution of cooperation” respectively. The tables show (i) whether
these papers present formal evolutionary models, and if so; (ii) whether altruism (as defined in the main text) can increase
in frequency under selection in any of the models presented in the paper, and if so; (iii) to which mechanism the authors
attribute the evolution of altruism; and (iv) whether the authors deny the role of relatedness in their model.
Table S3 evaluates the papers from Tables S1 and S2 which claim that relatedness does not play a role in their model.
This table comprises quotes evidencing the claim of unrelatedness, quotes evidencing the presence of relatedness, and an
indication as to whether or not kin selection operates.
Table S4 evaluates the papers which attribute the evolution of altruism to a mechanism other than kin selection but
do not preclude the operation of relatedness in their models. For these papers we highlight the proposed mechanism, the
mode of reproduction and interaction, and again indicate whether kin selection operates.
Table S5 presents search results for “Nowak cooperation”, whether the publications constitute primary research in
evolutionary theory, whether altruism can evolve, and the mechanism to which the evolution of altruism is attributed. This
table was extended until it included ten ‘spatial selection’ papers.
Table S6 evaluates the claims of seven of the 10 ‘spatial selection’ papers identified in Table S5 (the remaining three
already feature in Tables S3 and S4). The reproduction and interaction modes are identified, and whether kin selection
operates is indicated.
1
Table S1: Top 100 google scholar results for “Evolution of Cooperation” on 11/09/2019. Column 3 assesses whether the
work constitutes a primary theoretical contribution to evolutionary biology - i.e., is an evolutionary model presented in
the paper? Column 4 asks whether it is altruism or cooperation that increases in frequency under selection in the model
(i.e., holding b > 0, whether c is greater or less than 0). In some cases, depending on the features of the life cycle, the
phenotypic effect of alleles could be either cooperative or altruistic for different model parameter values - for these cases
we write ‘parameter-dependent’. If the entry did not present a formal evolutionary model (‘No’ in column 3) then we do
not assess whether altruism can evolve, and write ‘n/a’. Column 5 identifies the mechanism to which the authors attribute
the evolution of altruism, if altruism can evolve (otherwise we write ‘n/a’). Entries which do not credit relatedness are in
boldface and are analysed in Tables S3 and S4. Column 6 indicates whether or not the authors explicitly deny the role of
relatedness.
Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
1 The evolution of cooper-
ation (Axelrod & Hamil-
ton, 1981)1
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
2 Five rules for the evo-
lution of cooperation
(Nowak, 2006)2
No - review n/a n/a n/a
3 The evolution of coop-
eration in strategic al-
liances: initial condi-
tions or learning pro-
cesses? (Doz, 20073)
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a
4 The further evolution of
cooperation (Axelrod &
Dion, 1988)4
No - review n/a n/a n/a
5 A simple rule for the
evolution of coopera-






6 Evolution of cooperation
without reciprocity (Ri-







7 The evolution of co-
operation (Sachs et al,
2004)7
No - review n/a n/a n/a
8 Punishment allows the
evolution of cooperation
(or anything else) in siz-








9 Spatial structure often
inhibits the evolu-













Yes Altruism Group se-
lection
Yes
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
12 Genetic and cultural
evolution of cooperation
(Hammerstein, 2003)12
No - book n/a n/a n/a










14 Tit for tat in stickle-
backs and the evolution
of cooperation (Milinski,
1987)14
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a
15 Evolution of cooperation
and conflict in experi-
mental bacterial popula-
tions (Rainey & Rainey,
2003)15
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a








17 The evolution of coop-
eration and altruism – a
general framework and
a classification of mod-









Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
19 Why be nice? Psy-
chological constraints on
the evolution of cooper-
ation (Stevens & Hauser,
2004)19
No - review n/a n/a n/a
20 The evolution of one-
shot cooperation: An ex-
periment (Frank et al,
1993)20
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a
21 The evolution of coop-
eration in mobile organ-




















Continued on next page
∗The life-cycle assumptions of this model are not stated in the publication
†The meaning of this attribution, along with the meaning of various other attributions (e.g., ‘multiplex structure’) is not intuitive to biologists. They
are verbal descriptions of the distribution of individuals in the models, and how individuals interact. They can be thought of as spatial properties of the
model.)
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?




evolution of the idea
of nuclear arms control
(Adler, 1992)23
No - non-evolutionary n/a n/a n/a
24 Evolution of cooperation
among tumor cells (Ax-
elrod et al, 2006)24
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
25 Evolution of coop-
eration in multiplex
networks (Gómez-




26 Repression of competi-
tion and the evolution
of cooperation (Frank,
2003)26
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
27 Hand of God, mind
of man: Punishment




No - non-evolutionary n/a n/a n/a
28 Sixteen common mis-
conceptions about the
evolution of cooperation
in humans (West et al,
2011)28
No - review n/a n/a n/a
29 The evolution of coop-
eration in infinitely re-
peated games: Experi-
mental evidence (Dal Bó
& Fréchette, 2011)29
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a
30 Graph topology plays
a determinant role in
the evolution of coop-





31 The experience and evo-
lution of trust: Impli-
cations for cooperation
and teamwork (Jones &
George, 1998)31
No - non-evolutionary n/a n/a n/a










33 Evolution of coopera-
tion in a finite homoge-
neous graph (Taylor et
al, 2007)33
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a




No - non-evolutionary n/a n/a n/a
Continued on next page
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
35 Evolution of public co-
operation on interde-
pendent networks: The
impact of biased utility















ment, and the evolution
of human institutions
(Henrich, 2006)36
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
37 The good of wrath: Su-
pernatural punishment
and the evolution of
cooperation (Johnson &
Krüger, 2004)37
No - non-evolutionary n/a n/a n/a
38 Intuition, deliberation,
and the evolution of
cooperation (Bear &
Rand, 2016)38
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a








40 Emergence of spatial
structure in cell groups
and the evolution of
cooperation (Nadell et
al, 2010)40
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
41 Cooperation and conflict
in the evolution of mul-
ticellularity (Michod &
Roze, 2001)41
No - review n/a n/a n/a
42 Evolution of coopera-
tion between individuals
(Lotem et al, 1999)42
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
43 More evolution of coop-
eration (May, 1987)43
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
44 Evolution of cooperation
by phenotypic similarity






45 The biological evolution
of cooperation and trust
(Bateson, 2000)45
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
46 Evolution of coopera-
tion by generalized reci-












networks for the evo-
lution of cooperation
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
48 Know when to walk
away: contingent move-
ment and the evolution
of cooperation (Aktipis,
2004)48
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
49 Chaos and the evolution
of cooperation (Nowak
& Sigmund, 1993)49
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
50 Moral sentiments and
material interests: The
foundations of cooper-
ation in economic life
(Gintis et al, 2005)50
No - book n/a n/a n/a
51 Effect of spatial struc-
ture on the evolution of







The role of nonverbal
behavior in the evolution
of cooperation (Boone
& Buck, 2003)52
No - non-evolutionary n/a n/a n/a
53 Supercooperators: Al-
truism, evolution, and
why we need each other
to succeed (Nowak &
Highfield, 2011)53
No - book n/a n/a n/a




55 Evolution of coopera-












56 Cooperation and com-
petition in the evolu-
tion of ATP-producing





57 Emergence of cooper-
ation and organization
in an evolutionary game
(Challet & Zhang,
1997)57
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
58 Evolution of indirect
reciprocity (Nowak &
Sigmund, 2005)58
No - review n/a n/a n/a
59 Group living, competi-
tion, and the evolution
of cooperation in a ses-
sile invertebrate (Buss,
1981)59
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a
Continued on next page
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
60 Evolution of coopera-
tion on scale-free net-
works subject to er-






61 Emergence of cooper-
ation and evolutionary
stability in finite pop-
ulations (Nowak et al,
2004)61
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
62 Morphs, dispersal be-
havior, genetic similar-
ity, and the evolution of
cooperation (Sinervo &
Clobert, 2003)62












64 The evolution of co-
operation within the
gut microbiota (Rakoff-
Nahoum et al, 2016)64
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a








66 Enforcement and the
Evolution of Coopera-
tion (Downs, 1997)66
No - review n/a n/a n/a
67 Social diversity pro-
motes the emergence of
cooperation in public
goods games (Santos et
al, 2008)67





defection (Imhof et al,
2005)68
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a




No - review n/a n/a n/a
70 The role of diversity in
the evolution of coop-




of defectors sustains co-
operation and can prolif-
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
72 Co-evolution of be-
haviour and social net-
work structure promotes
human cooperation
(Fehl et al, 2011)72
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a
73 Evolution of coop-
eration in spatially
structured populations






74 Social diversity and
promotion of coop-
eration in the spatial
prisoner’s dilemma
game (Perc & Szolnoki,
2008)74
Yes Altruism Social di-
versity
No
75 Social dilemmas in an
online social network:
the structure and evo-
lution of cooperation





76 Uncertainty and the
evolution of cooperation
(Bendor, 1993)76
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
77 Evolution of cooperation
under N-person snow-
drift games (Souza et al,
2009)77
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
78 The algebra of assorta-







79 Origins of human coop-
eration (Bowles & Gin-
tis, 2003)79
No - book chapter n/a n/a n/a
80 Inferring reputation
promotes the evolu-
tion of cooperation in
spatial social dilemma













No - review n/a n/a n/a
82 If players are sparse so-
cial dilemmas are too:
Importance of percola-
tion for evolution of co-








83 Culture and the evolu-
tion of human coopera-
tion (Boyd & Richerson,
2009)83
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
Continued on next page
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
84 Behavior-dependent
contexts for repeated
plays of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma II:
Dynamical aspects

















ment can prevent the
co-evolution of punish-
ment and cooperation








87 Evolution of cooperation
and control of cheat-
ing in a social microbe
(Strassmann & Queller,
2011)87
No - review n/a n/a n/a
88 Impact of aging on the
evolution of coopera-
tion in the spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma game







89 A functional imaging
study of cooperation in
two-person reciprocal
exchange (McCabe et al,
2001)89
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a




Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
91 Kin competition and the
evolution of cooperation
(Platt & Bever, 2009)91
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
92 Cooperation and non-
linear dynamics: an eco-
logical perspective on
the evolution of sociality
(Avilés 1999)92
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
93 Anarchy, egoism, and
third images: The Evolu-
tion of Cooperation and
international relations
(Gowa, 1986)93
No - book review n/a n/a n/a








95 The evolution of cooper-
ation (Dugatkin, 1997)95
No -review n/a n/a n/a
Continued on next page
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
96 Evolution of coop-







97 Importance of coopera-
tion and affiliation in the
evolution of primate so-
ciality (Sussman et al,
2005)97
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
98 Conditional strategies












No - non-evolutionary n/a n/a n/a
100 The evolution of degrees
of cooperation (Frean,
1996)100
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
Table S2: Top 100 papers for “Evolution of Altruism” on 11/09/2019. This table follows the same structure as Table S1;
see Table S1 legend for details.
Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
1 The evolution of altru-
istic behavior (Hamilton,
1963)101












3 Reliability in communi-
cation systems and the
evolution of altruism
(Zahavi, 1977)103
No - book chapter n/a n/a n/a
4 A simple and general ex-
planation for the evolu-
tion of altruism (Fletcher
& Doebeli, 2008)104
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
5 The unit of selection in
viscous populations and
the evolution of altru-







6 Population viscosity and
the evolution of altru-
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
7 Alternate routes to so-
ciality in jays—with a
theory for the evolution
of altruism and com-
munal breeding (Brown,
2015)107
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a
8 Genetics of mutualism:
the evolution of altruism
between species (Frank,
1994)108
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
9 Conditions for the evo-
lution of altruism un-
der Darwinian selection
(Matessi & Jayakar)109
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
10 The evolution of recip-
rocal altruism (Trivers,
1971)110
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
11 Evolution and altruism:
Combining psychologi-
cal mediators with natu-
rally selected tendencies
(Kruger, 2003)111
No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a
12 Contextual analysis of
models of group selec-
tion, soft selection, hard
selection, and the evolu-
tion of altruism (Good-
night et al, 1992)112
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
13 Restricted migration and
the evolution of altruism
(Kelly, 1992)113
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
14 Interdemic selection
and the evolution



















16 The evolution of altru-
ism in humans (Kurzban
et al, 2015)115
No - review n/a n/a n/a
17 Evolution of indirect
reciprocity by social
information: the role
of trust and reputation
in evolution of altruism
(Mohtashemi & Mui,
2003)116
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
18 Kin selection is the key
to altruism (Foster et al,
2006)117
No - review n/a n/a n/a
Continued on next page
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
19 Parental manipulation,
kin selection, and the
evolution of altruism
(Craig, 1979)118
Yes Altriusm Relatedness n/a




Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
21 The evolution of altru-
ism and the ordering of
love (Pope, 1994)120
No - book n/a n/a n/a
22 A note on the evolution
of altruism in structured
demes (Charlesworth,
1979)121
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
23 Adaptive evolution of
social traits: origin, tra-
jectories, and correla-
tions of altruism and mo-
bility (Le Galliard et al,
2005)122
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
24 Altruism through
beard chromodynamics





25 The evolution of al-
truism: Correlation,





























28 Can altruism evolve in
purely viscous popula-







29 A quantitative test of
Hamilton’s rule for the
evolution of altruism
(Waibel et al, 2011)128
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
30 The evolution of altru-
ism: game theory in mul-
tilevel selection and in-
clusive fitness (Fletcher
& Zwick, 2007)129
No - review n/a n/a n/a
Continued on next page
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
31 Group selection, al-
truism, reinforcement,
and throwing in human
evolution (Darlington Jr,
1975)130
No - review n/a n/a n/a
32 Putting the altruism back
into altruism: the evo-
lution of empathy (De
Waal, 2008)131
No - review n/a n/a n/a
33 Altruism as a handicap:
the limitations of kin se-
lection and reciprocity
(Zahavi, 1995)132
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a




No - empirical research n/a n/a n/a
35 The evolution of altru-















36 Kin recognition and the
evolution of altruism
(Agrawal, 2001)135
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a




No - book n/a n/a n/a
38 Altruism, spite, and
greenbeards (West &
Gardner, 2010)137










40 Altruism: Its character-
istics and evolution (Dar-
lington Jr, 1978)139
No - review n/a n/a n/a
41 Models of the evolu-
tion of altruism (May-
nard Smith, 1980)140
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
42 Evolution of altruism un-
der group selection in
large and small popula-
tions in fluctuating envi-
ronments (Uyenoyama,
1979)141
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
43 What is altruism? (Kerr
et al, 2004)142
No - review n/a n/a n/a
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
45 Inbreeding and the evo-
lution of altruism under




Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
46 Genetic relatedness and
the evolution of altruism
(Okasha, 2002)145
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
47 Origins of altruism and
cooperation (Sussman &
Cloninger, 2011)146






No - book n/a n/a n/a
49 Sex-biased dispersal of
adults mediates the evo-
lution of altruism among
juveniles (Gardner,
2010)148
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
50 Inclusive fitness in evo-
lution (Ferriere & Mi-
chod, 2011)149
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
51 Gene-culture coevolu-
tion: models for the
evolution of altruism
with cultural transmis-
sion (Feldman et al,
1985)150
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a








53 Friendship and the
banker’s paradox: Other
pathways to the evo-
lution of adaptations
for altruism (Tooby &
Cosmides, 1996)152
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
54 The evolution of coop-
eration and altruism – a
general framework and
a classification of mod-





55 ”Runaway” social evo-
lution: reinforcing se-
lection for inbreeding
and altruism (Breden &
Wade, 1991)153
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
56 Biological altruism
(Okasha, 2003)154
No - book chapter n/a n/a n/a
Continued on next page
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
57 Moral origins: The evo-
lution of virtue, altru-
ism, and shame (Boehm,
2012)155




No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
59 Selfishness as second-
order altruism (Eldakar
& Wilson, 2008)157
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
60 On the evolution of
altruism by kin selection
(Matessi & Karlin,
1984)158
Yes Yes Relatedness n/a
61 The generalized ex-
change perspective on
the evolution of altruism
(Takagi, 1996)159
No - book chapter n/a n/a n/a
62 Sex-ratio conflicts,




No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
63 Demography, altruism,
and the benefits of bud-
ding (Gardner & West,
2006)161
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
64 Supercooperators: Al-
truism, evolution, and
why we need each other
to succeed (Nowak &
Highfield, 2011)53
No - book n/a n/a n/a
65 Evolution of indirect
reciprocity (Nowak &
Sigmund, 2005)58
No - review n/a n/a n/a
66 Altruism and organ-
ism: Disentangling the
themes of multilevel se-
lection theory (Wilson,
1997)162
No - review n/a n/a n/a








68 Group selection and
the evolution of al-
truism (Cooper &
Wallace, 2004)164
Yes Altruism Group se-
lection
No
69 Life history, habitat sat-
uration and the evolution
of fecundity and survival
altruism (Lion & Gan-
don, 2010)165
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
Continued on next page
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
70 Altruism in Mendelian
populations derived







71 Genetic stability and ter-
ritorial structure facili-
tate the evolution of tag-
mediated altruism (Spec-
tor & Klein, 2006)167
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
72 The coevolution of
parochial altruism and







73 Altruism in forest chim-
panzees: the case of
adoption (Boesch et al,
2010)169
No - empirical n/a n/a n/a
74 Evolution of mutual-
ism through spatial
effects (Yamamura et al,
2004)170
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
75 Ultimate causes and the
evolution of altruism
(Marshall, 2011)171
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
76 The adaptive dynamics
of altruism in spatially
heterogeneous popula-
tions (Le Galliard et al,
2003)172
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
77 The evolution of hu-
man altruism (Kitcher,
1993)173
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
78 Problems with altruism
(Bertram, 1982)174
No - book chapter n/a n/a n/a
79 Neoproterozoic ’snow-
ball Earth’ glaciations
and the evolution of
altruism (Boyle et al,
2007)175
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
80 The evolution of cheat-
ing and selfish behav-






81 Questioning the cultural
evolution of altru-
ism (André & Morin,
2011)177
No - review n/a n/a n/a
82 The evolution of eu-
sociality (Nowak et al,
2010)178
Yes Altruism Group se-
lection
Yes
83 The coevolution of
altruism and punish-
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Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
84 Social evolution in
structured populations















86 The evolution of alarm
calls: altruism or ma-
nipulation? (Charnov &
Krebs, 1975)182
Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
87 Is altruism evolutionarily
stable? (Bester & Güth,
1994)183
Yes Cooperaiton n/a n/a
88 An adaptation for altru-
ism: The social causes,
social effects, and so-
cial evolution of grati-
tude (McCullough et al,
2008)184
No - non-evolutionary n/a n/a n/a
89 Ecological symmetry
breaking can favour the











No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
91 Deterministic group









92 Pathogen resistance as
the origin of kin altruism
(Lewis, 1998)188
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
93 A simple rule for the
evolution of coopera-






94 The evolution of social
behavior — A classifica-
tion of models (Maynard
Smith, 1982)189
No - book chapter n/a n/a n/a
95 Some models of the evo-
lution of altruistic be-
haviour between siblings
(Charlesworth, 1978)190
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
96 On the relationship
between evolutionary
and psychological defi-
nitions of altruism and
selfishness (Wilson,
1992)191
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a
Continued on next page
17
Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution Denies relatedness?
97 An inclusive fitness
analysis of altruism
on a cyclical network
(Grafen, 2007)192
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
98 Genes underlying altru-
ism (Thompson et al,
2013)193
No - perspective n/a n/a n/a




Yes Cooperation n/a n/a
100 The genetical evolution
of social behaviour. II
(Hamilton, 1964)195
Yes Altruism Relatedness n/a
Table S3: Papers where the authors explicitly deny that their models entail relatedness (quotes taken from the papers are
shown in column 2). But their models do entail relatedness (as shown by quotes from the same papers in column 3), and
kin selection therefore operates (i.e., rb > 0) on genetic and/or cultural variants (column 4)




“Groups consist of genet-
ically unrelated individu-
als”
“In any one time step,
a single individual
from the entire pop-
ulation is chosen for
reproduction... The
offspring is added to
the same group.”
“Interactions occur be-






“Our results do not require
that group members be re-
lated”
“Parents pass on their
type to their off-
spring... Selfish agents
inherit the estimate




agent works alone for
a period of time before
being readmitted to a
group. ”
“Agents can also work
cooperatively in a
group, each producing
an amount b at cost
c (all benefits and
costs are in fitness
units). We assume that
output of the group is
shared equally by the
agents, so if all group
members work, each
has a net group fitness




“This behavior is puz-
zling from an evolutionary
perspective because coop-
erating individuals incur
individual costs to con-
fer benefits on unrelated
group members”
“An individual i who
encounters an individ-
ual j imitates j with
probability Wj/(Wj +
Wi, where Wx is the
















“Whenever a site x is
updated, a neighbor y
is drawn at random
among all kx neigh-
bors”
“In each generation,
all pairs of individu-
als x and y, directly
connected, engage in a
single round of a given
game”
Yes, on genes
Continued on next page
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as a metaphor for studying
cooperation between un-
related individuals”
“To update a strategy
located in vertex x, a
neighbour y is drawn




our unit of discrete
evolutionary time), all
pairs of directly con-
nected individuals, x
and y, engage in a sin-




“The evolution of cooper-
ation among unrelated in-
dividuals is studied in a
lattice-structured habitat”
“After the death of an
individual, the site is
replaced immediately











“The study of evolution-
ary games on networks
and graphs ... has proven
very gratifying in terms
of improving our under-
standing of the emergence
and sustenance of coop-





“in each group co-
operators contribute 1












located in a given ver-
tex will be replicated
to the next generation
or, instead, will be re-
placed by the strategy
of a better fit neigh-
bour.”










ory provides a system-
atic framework for investi-
gating the emergence and
maintenance of coopera-
tive behavior among unre-
lated and selfish individu-
als”
“players are allowed
to adopt the strategies










anisms have been pro-
posed ... to promote the
evolution of cooperation
among unrelated individu-
als... Here we propose an
approach that ...”
“After the neighbor j
is chosen, player i
adopts the strategy s j
of the selected player
j”
First, player i acquires
its payoff Pi by play-
ing the game with all
its neighbors.
Yes, on memes
Continued on next page
‡In this and other cultural models, strategies are equivalent to phenotypes in genetic clonal models to which they compare. When one strategy is
chosen to update a given vertex, this is equivalent to the death of an individual with a particular phenotype, and subsequent replacement by the offspring
of a neighbour (i.e., reproduction under local dispersal).
§‘strategy invasions’ are equivalent to ‘strategy updates’ (see previous footnote), and are also equivalent to ‘strategy replacement’, ‘strategy adoption’,
and ‘strategy enforcement’ (in the following table entries). In all of these cases, memes spread locally and so are likely to interact with memes with
which they share a recent common ancestor.
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Publication Claim of unrelatedness Mode of reproduction Mode of interaction Kin selection operates
Szolnoki and
Perc, 201298
“new ways by means
of which the successful
evolution of cooperation
among selfish and unre-




a chance for every
player to enforce its
strategy onto one of its
neighbors”
“A randomly selected
player x plays the pub-
lic goods game with
its G − 1 partners as
a member of all the
g groups, whereby its
overall payoff Psx is
thus the sum of all
the payoffs acquired in
the five groups. Next,
player x chooses one
of its nearest neigh-
bors at random, and
the chosen coplayer y
also acquires its payoff




“The left-hand term, like
Hamilton’s degree of re-
latedness (r), is a mea-
sure of positive assort-
ment; but here assort-
ment arises solely from
between-deme differences








“Altruists (A’s) take an
action costing c that
confers a benefit b
on an individual ran-
domly selected from

















the probability of sur-
vival for each deme
is computed from the
formula:
PSi = a+bqei
where a, b and c are
constants and qi is
the post-migration fre-







with close genetic kin is
not involved”
“members of each
group are paired ran-
domly with members
of their group to pro-
duce offspring... With




“We model the evo-
lution of genetically
transmitted behavioral
types in a population
of foragers who en-






“In our model relatedness
does not drive the evolu-
tion of eusociality”
“We assume that the
dispersal behaviour
can be affected by
genetic mutations. We
postulate a mutant al-
lele, a, which induces
daughters to stay with
the nest.”
“AA and Aa daughters
leave the nest, whereas
aa stay at the nest with
probability q, and be-
come workers”
Yes, on genes
Continued on next page
¶This quote makes explicit that the model is an ‘isolation-by-distance’ model, but the same is true for all other models in this table. Wherever
neighbours interact with neighbours (local interaction) and offspring are placed into the same neighbourhood as the parents (local dispersal) then the
population will exhibit isolation-by-distance, and individuals/ strategies will be positively related to the individuals/ strategies with which they interact.
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“Punishment is an impor-
tant mechanism promot-
ing the evolution of altru-
ism among non-relatives.
We investigate...”
“After the death of
an individual, the site
becomes empty, and










is often kinship-based or
reciprocal. Several exam-
ples show, however, that ...
people are willing to sup-
port unrelated others even
when this is at a cost and
they receive nothing in ex-
change. Here we exam-
ine the evolution of this
“pure” altruism”
“we have a “viscous”
population in which
reproduction and inter-
action takes place lo-
cally”
“we have a “viscous”
population in which
reproduction and inter-
action takes place lo-
cally”
Yes, on genes
Table S4: Impactful papers presenting evolutionary models where altruism evolves, and the authors attribute the evolution
of altruism to a mechanism other then kin selection (column 1). In all cases, the benefits of altruism are accrued by
relatives (columns 2 and 3), and kin selection operates on genetic and/or cultural variants (column 4)




as a consequence of ‘so-
cial viscosity’”
“at each time step, a
random individual is
chosen to die. . . sub-
sequently the neigh-
bours compete for the
empty site”
“Interactions occur be-






“spatial structure can pro-
mote persistence of coop-
eration”
“Whenever a site is
updated, the present
occupant and its near-
est neighbours com-
pete to populate the
site with their off-
spring”
“individuals interact








procity evolve and what
would it be like?”
“A new generation is














hances the resilience of
cooperation to defection”
“Each of the players,
say i, chooses... a
neighbor j... agent i
will take the strategy
of j”
“After round t... an
individual has played
once with its kli neigh-
bors”
Yes, on memes
Continued on next page
‖‘new individuals’ being ‘locally derived’ equates to limited dispersal and isolation-by-distance. Under these conditions, individuals will generally
be surrounded by individuals with whom they share recent common ancestors (i.e., relatives).
∗The crucial words here are ‘from the group’; the population is a structured one, comprising multiple groups, and individuals are more likely to
interact with other individuals from their group (with whom they are, on average, positively related) than with individuals from other groups.
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neighbor of x within
the same network, de-
noted by y... player x
attempts to adopt the
strategy sy from player
y with a probability”
“player x acquires its
utility Ux by playing






have been proposed to
explain the appearance
and survival of coopera-
tion. . . the structure of the
population being one of
them”
“With the replicator
rule one neighbor j ∈
Ni is chosen at ran-
dom. The probability
of player i adopting the
strategy of player j”
“each individual only







be necessary to sustain co-
operation”
“Reproduction con-
sists of creating an
offspring in an ad-
jacent empty site, if
there is one”
“Each pair of neigh-







that increases the fitness
of others at a cost to
oneself can be promoted
by ... population struc-




their strategies by im-
itating their partners”
“The payoff of each
individual is obtained
by playing the PD





“a form of cooperative re-
source use and may evolve
in spatially structured en-
vironments”
“spatial model includ-
ing diffusion of cells”†
“spatial model includ-
ing diffusion of ... re-
source”‡
Yes, on genes
Perc, 200960 “The decline of coopera-
tion can be directly linked
to the decrease of hetero-
geneity of scale-free net-
works”
“one randomly chosen
neighbor of x, denoted
by y, also acquires its
payoff py by playing
the game with all its
ky neighbors. Lastly, if
px > py player x tries
to enforce its strategy
sx on player y”
“a randomly selected
player x acquires its
payoff px by playing







also promoted by the
viscosity of populations”
“Each player tends to
copy successful strate-
gies in their neigh-
bourhood”§
“everybody partic-
ipates in the two-







rather than well mixed,
the clustering of cooper-







player x acquires its
payoff Px by playing
the game with all its
neighbors on the inter-
action network”
Yes, on memes
Continued on next page
†The exact structure of this model is rather opaque, however the fact that the cells diffuse in a spatial model implies that reproduction occurs locally
and that neighbouring cells are likely to share a recent common ancestor.
‡A locally dispersing resource implies that interactions predominantly occur locally.
§The ‘strategy copying’ described here is the same process as ‘strategy update’ (i.e., equivalent to birth and death).
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diversity by means of
heterogeneous graphs and
show that cooperation is
promoted by the diversity
associated with the num-
ber and size of the public
goods game in which each
individual participates
and with the individual
contribution to each such
game”
“When a site x with
a payoff Px is selected
for update, a neigh-
bour y (with a payoff
Py) is drawn at random
between all kx neigh-
bours. If Px > Py, no
update occurs. If Px <
Py, x will adopt y’s
strategy with a prob-
ability given by (Py −
Px)/M”
“individuals occupy








ity. . . holds back the inva-
sion of free riders”
“We consider that
each individual i




is contingent on the






influences the evolution of
cooperation”
“all individuals of the
nxn lattice play an
IPD game against their
eight nearest neigh-
bours”
“the individual on each
cell is replaced by an
offspring of the high-
est scoring individual
among the former site






“The facilitation of the
cooperative strategy relies
mostly on the inhomoge-
neous social state of play-
ers, resulting in the forma-
tion of cooperative clus-
ters which are ruled by so-
cially high-ranking play-
ers that are able to prevail
against the defectors”
“The performance of
player i is compared
with that of a ran-
domly chosen neigh-
bor j and the proba-
bility that its strategy
changes to s j is given
by ...”
“Each individual is al-
lowed to interact only











by y, also acquires
its payoff py by play-
ing the game with its
four neighbors. Lastly,
player x tries to en-
force its strategy sx on
player y”
“player x acquires its
payoff px by playing






“The tendency for cluster-
ing among like strategists
to enhance their initial in-




t + 1, is the result of
competition between
TFT and all-D”
“pa and pb are the re-
spective probabilities
that TFT and all-D as-
sort”
Yes, on genes
Continued on next page
¶On a graph, edges connect neighbouring vertices, so interactions proceeding along edges’ translates as individuals interacting locally.
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revealed that spatial struc-
ture can favor the co-
evolution of punishment
and cooperation... our re-
sults demonstrate serious
restrictions on the ability
of costly punishment to al-
low the evolution of coop-
eration in spatially struc-
tured populations.”
“Each player interacts
with the four players
in her von Neumann
neighbourhood”
“In each generation a
random player is given
a chance to update her
strategy... With prob-
ability ... she aban-
dons her current strat-
egy (i.e. dies) and ran-
domly adopts the strat-
egy of one of the z






structure may foster the
formation of cooperative
clusters on the grid”
“one randomly chosen
neighbor denoted by y
also acquires its payoff
py by playing the game
with its four neigh-
bors. Lastly, player
x tries to enforce its
strategy sx on player y”
“player x acquires its
payoff px by playing













by y, also acquires
its payoff Py by play-
ing the game with its
four neighbors. Lastly,
player x tries to en-
force its strategy sx on
player y”
“player x acquires its
payoff Px by playing





“space indeed plays a def-
inite role in the evolution
of cooperation, because a
spatially restricted inter-
action may lead to a global
cooperation”
“if one of its neigh-
bors j has received
the higher payoff, then
agent i will adopt the
behavior of the respec-
tive agent”
“each agent only lo-






“a new mechanism that
combines both lines of
work to show when and
how favoritism toward ap-
parently similar others can
evolve in the first place.
The mechanism is the
joint operation of viscos-
ity and of tags...”
“offspring are created
only if they can be
placed in an empty site
adjacent to the parent”









they find an empty
site within disper-





determined by its own
strategy and by its
neighbourhood”
Yes, on genes
Continued on next page
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“The smaller the group
size, or the larger the
benefit-to-cost ratio,
the higher the survival
chances of altruism.
Additionally, for altruism
to survive, the number
of generations spent in
isolated groups must be





payoffs the new pro-
portion of altruists
within each group is
calculated”
“agents interact only






“we compare our standard
group selection model
with a recently proposed




is composed of an
infinite number of
demes, each of which





takes place inside the
demes”
“The alleles A or B
at a single locus deter-




or reproductive rate of
the individuals is de-
termined solely by this
trait”
Yes, on genes
Table S5: Top papers for “Nowak cooperation” on 28/10/2019. This table follows the same structure as Table S1 (though
does not ask whether the presence of relatedness is explicitly denied); see Table S1 legend for details.
Index Publication Formal evolutionary model? Phenotype Attribution
1 Five rules for the
evolution of coopera-
tion (Nowak, 2006)2





Yes Altruism Spatial pattern





4 Evolution of indirect
reciprocity (Nowak
& Sigmund, 2005)58
No - review n/a n/a
5 A strategy of win-
stay, lose-shift that
outperforms tit-for-











Yes Altruism Spatial position‖
Continued on next page
‖The wording of the attributions is taken from the publications, and the plethora of terms (‘spatial pattern’, ‘spatial position’, ‘population structure’,
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tions (Nowak et al,
2004)61
Yes Cooperation n/a
8 The evolution of eu-
sociality (Nowak et
al, 2010)178
Yes Altruism Population struc-
ture













(Rand et al, 2012)200





No - review n/a n/a
13 Fairness versus rea-
son in the ultimatum
game (Nowak et al,
2000)202
Yes Cooperation n/a








No - review n/a n/a
16 SuperCooperators:
Altruism, Evolution,
and why we need
each other to succeed
(Nowak & Highfield,
2011)53
No - book n/a n/a





Yes Altruism Group selection
19 Winners don’t pun-
ish (Dreber et al,
2008)205
No - empirical research n/a n/a
20 Via freedom to co-
ercion: the emer-




Continued on next page
‘graph arrangement’, ‘spatial effects’, ‘spatial parameters’ etc.) are all variations around the same theme: where populations have spatial structure, and
individuals disperse and interact locally, then positive relatedness among interacting individuals emerges from the spatial structure of the population.
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Index Publication Novel evolutionary model? Altruism evolves? Attribution







eration (Rand et al,
2009)208
No - empirical research n/a n/a
23 Coevolution of strat-








eration (Rand et al,
2014)210
No - empirical research n/a n/a
25 Reward and punish-
ment (Sigmund et al,
2001)211
Yes Cooperation n/a





Yes Altruism Spatial parameters
27 Stochastic dynamics
of invasion and fixa-



















Yes Altruism Spatial selection
31 The arithmetics of
mutual help (Nowak
et al, 2001)217






33 More spatial games
(Nowak et al,
1994b)218
Yes Altruism Spatial arrays
Continued on next page
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Yes Altruism Population struc-
ture
Table S6: ‘Spatial selection’ papers authored by Martin Nowak and colleagues. In all cases, levels of relatedness are high,
dispersal is limited (column 2), interactions are local (column 3), and kin selection therefore operates on genetic and/or
cultural variants (column 4)
Publication Reproduction mode Interaction mode Kin selection operates
Nowak and May,
1992196
“At the start of the next generation,
each lattice-site is occupied by the
player with the highest score among
the previous owner and the immedi-
ate neighbours”
“each round every individ-





“players arranged on a directed cy-
cle... with player i placing its off-
spring into i+1”
“the payoff of any individ-
ual comes from an interac-





“After this, each site is occupied by
either its original owner or by one
of the neighbours”
“In each round every indi-
vidual “play the game” with
its immediate neighbours”
Yes, on genes
Nowak et al, 1994212 “. . . After this, each site is occupied
either by its original owner or by
one of the neighbors”
“players. . . interact with
neighbors in some spatial ar-
ray”
Yes, on genes
Nowak et al, 2010216 “one individual is chosen at random
to die; the neighbours compete for
the empty site”
“Each individual interacts




“a cell is always given to its most
successful neighbour”∗∗
“Another possibility is to
study spatial games in three
dimensions... Here interac-





“the offspring of this individual re-
places a randomly chosen neigh-
bor”
“the fitness of an individual
is locally determined from
interactions with all adjacent
individuals”
Yes, on genes and
memes
References
[1] Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. D. The evolution of cooperation. Science 211, 1390–1396 (1981).
[2] Nowak, M. A. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314, 1560–1563 (2006).
[3] Doz, Y. L. The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: initial conditions or learning processes? Strategic
Management Journal 17, 55–83 (1996).
[4] Axelrod, R. & Dion, D. The further evolution of cooperation. Science 242, 1385–1390 (1988).
[5] Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E. & Nowak, M. A. A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs
and social networks. Nature 441, 502 (2006).
∗∗This entry is one of Nowak’s earlier papers mentioned in Box 2, where the model is deterministic. Note that a cell is always given to the most
successful neighbour. This means that with a single altruist, altruism could never spread. For the models to give interesting results, they are seeded with
multiple altruists. Since these are created simultaneously, they share no common ancestry, and are ‘identical by state’. However, because reproduction is
local in the models, the offspring of the founders interact with relatives, and so kin selection plays a role in the propagation and maintenance of altruism.
The determinism also results in symmetrical distributions of selfish individuals and altruists at the population level (when the model is initiated with a
symmetrical distribution). Together these factors made Nowak’s models appear different from the concurrent kin selection models despite the fact that
the mechanism driving the evolution of altruism was the same.
28
[6] Riolo, R. L., Cohen, M. D. & Axelrod, R. Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity. Nature 414, 441 (2001).
[7] Sachs, J. L., Mueller, U. G., Wilcox, T. P. & Bull, J. J. The evolution of cooperation. The Quarterly Review of
Biology 79, 135–160 (2004).
[8] Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups.
Ethology and Sociobiology 13, 171–195 (1992).
[9] Hauert, C. & Doebeli, M. Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game. Nature
428, 643 (2004).
[10] Traulsen, A. & Nowak, M. A. Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 103, 10952–10955 (2006).
[11] Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theoretical
Population Biology 65, 17–28 (2004).
[12] Hammerstein, P. Genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation (MIT press, 2003).
[13] Leimar, O. & Hammerstein, P. Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 268, 745–753 (2001).
[14] Milinski, M. Tit for tat in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation. Nature 325, 433–435 (1987).
[15] Rainey, P. B. & Rainey, K. Evolution of cooperation and conflict in experimental bacterial populations. Nature
425, 72–74 (2003).
[16] Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. J. The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 100, 3531–3535 (2003).
[17] Lehmann, L. & Keller, L. The evolution of cooperation and altruism–a general framework and a classification of
models. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 19, 1365–1376 (2006).
[18] Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 393, 573–577 (1998).
[19] Stevens, J. R. & Hauser, M. D. Why be nice? psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 8, 60–65 (2004).
[20] Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T. & Regan, D. T. The evolution of one-shot cooperation: An experiment. Ethology and
Sociobiology 14, 247–256 (1993).
[21] Enquist, M. & Leimar, O. The evolution of cooperation in mobile organisms. Animal Behaviour 45, 747–757
(1993).
[22] Santos, F. C. & Pacheco, J. M. Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation.
Physical Review Letters 95, 098104 (2005).
[23] Adler, E. The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the
idea of nuclear arms control. International Organization 46, 101–145 (1992).
[24] Axelrod, R., Axelrod, D. E. & Pienta, K. J. Evolution of cooperation among tumor cells. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 103, 13474–13479 (2006).
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[181] Németh, A. & Takács, K. The evolution of altruism in spatially structured populations. Journal of Artificial
Societies and Social Simulation 10, 4 (2007).
[182] Charnov, E. L. & Krebs, J. R. The evolution of alarm calls: altruism or manipulation? The American Naturalist
109, 107–112 (1975).
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